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from the more traditional understanding of precedent, we view the CJEU's approach as an acceptable exercise of judicial authority in a case law system.
II. The Claim -CJEU is a Constitutional, Precedent-Driven Court
We agree that there are grounds for criticizing the CJEU's approach vis-à-vis its own case law. For example, the reasoning of many judgments lacks transparency and consistency and the language is often cryptic and overly succinct. 20 But the Court's method is not as deficient as some commentators argue.
Our claim, which this article will support, is that the CJEU is a precedent-driven 21 constitutional court comparable to the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) and with a comparable approach to precedent. We further argue that this case law approach is acceptable given the nature of the CJEU. Thus, we use the SCOTUS as a yardstick for measuring whether the CJEU takes case law seriously. 22 From this we conclude that the existing debate regarding how the CJEU establishes and relates to precedent would benefit from a broader (internal and external) comparative perspective. On one hand, criticisms against the CJEU's approach are normally based on a limited number of CJEU decisions. 23 On the other hand, criticisms of the CJEU's approach to case law seldom reflect on the way precedent is deployed in other legal systems. Regarding the former of these points, it is problematic to evaluate a sprawling, extensive, and continuously expanding system of case law-comprising thousands of individual decisionson the basis of a limited number of well-known judgments. 24 This shortcoming in typical evaluations of the CJEU's practice is not surprising given the limitations of traditional legal 20 See also Mattias Derlén, Multilingual Interpretation of CJEU Case Law: Rule and Reality, 39 EUR. L. REV. 295, 296-99 (2014) . 21 The concept of precedent is discussed infra Part B. 22 This choice for comparison is explained and defended immediately infra. 23 This does not prevent scholars from making general claims. See, e.g., TREVOR C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 72 (6th ed. 2007) (claiming that the frequency of citations in CJEU judgments has increased). 24 
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The CJEU & SCOTUS -A Network Perspective 651 methods. 25 We echo Posner's and Fallon's battle cry, calling for empirical analysis of precedent in the US context. 26 Only by combining quantitative and qualitative methods can we fruitfully discuss and understand the use of case law as a source of European Union law.
For these reasons, this comparison of the CJEU's and USSC's attitudes to precedent takes an empirical approach relying on network analysis. 27 Fowler has pioneered this approach in the American context in two landmark articles. 28 We draw inspiration for our study of the CJEU from existing studies of SCOTUS case law that use network analysis, including Fowler's. We replicate those studies and apply them to a network consisting of the CJEU's judgments, 29 and enrich our analysis by contrasting and comparing our results from those achieved with respect to the SCOTUS.
The discussion below reveals that there are fundamental similarities between how the SCOTUS and the CJEU establish and use precedent. This, in turn, suggests that the latter court in many ways approaches its precedent in the same way as the former and should be judged accordingly. Three main arguments supporting this claim are presented below. The first argument, advanced in Part D, is that similarities in the basic features of the networks of CJEU and SCOTUS judgments negate claims that the CJEU establishes and uses precedent without any form of method. The second argument, presented in Part E, is that previous judgments are an indispensable source of law for both the CJEU and the SCOTUS and that this constitutes clear evidence of a system of precedent. 30 The third and final argument, defended in Part F, is that the CJEU's citation approach has four main components -(i) stages of development, (ii) issue shifting, (iii) a general approach to existing case law and a different approach to important cases, and (iv) overruling and avoiding precedent -and that its approach stands up quite well in a comparison with the SCOTUS's. 25 All studies mentioned in Part A.I are examples of such qualitative studies, encompassing a limited number of judgments from the Court of Justice. Even Jacob, who conduct a quantitative study, only discuss 52 judgments. See JACOB, supra note 13, at 87. 27 The use of network analysis is described in more detail infra Part C.II. 
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The CJEU is still influenced by its civil law roots. But this article empirically demonstrates that it exhibits key features of a case law based legal system. The CJEU has a systematic approach for deciding when to cite case law and determining which case law to cite. The CJEU regards case law as an indispensable source of law. And, as measured by a number of key metrics, the CJEU uses approaches to case law and precedent that are similar to those used by the SCOTUS. Consequently, while the CJEU deserves much of the criticism it receives, our findings suggest that its approach to precedent is not as poor as some would claim.
B. Setting the Scene -Moving Beyond the Traditional View of Precedent
The importance of precedent 31 is continuously emphasized, including descriptions of precedent as the "life blood of legal systems."
32 Yet, despite all the spilled ink, the discussion of the nature and meaning of precedent has remained surprisingly stagnant. It is traditionally claimed that the common law and civil law traditions approach the doctrine of precedent in fundamentally different ways. This claim is primarily based on differences in the binding effect of previous judgments and, in particular, the absence of stare decisis in the civil law tradition. 33 Differing from the common law tradition, where court judgments are seen as a way to develop the law from below, 34 the civil law tradition does not regard earlier decisions as absolutely binding. Instead, previous judgements merely serve as interpretations of statutory law. 35 The binding/non-binding dichotomy is too simplified to capture the attitude towards case law in the civil law and common law traditions. Indeed, the discussion about whether precedent constitutes a binding source of law in civil law has overshadowed the practical importance of case law. 36 Even if judgments are not formally binding, the authority 31 As will be demonstrated by the discussion below, we here use precedent in a wide sense, encompassing all use of previous judgments, not limited to binding precedent. 
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The CJEU & SCOTUS -A Network Perspective 653 of decisions of higher courts can be a de facto very strong influence on decisions of lower courts. 37 This is sometimes described as "precedent in the broad sense" or "persuasive precedent," as opposed to precedent in the strict sense. 38 The differences between the common law and civil law traditions are more formal than practical.
39
Concentrating on the issue of binding sources of law is not productive. To move on we have to acknowledge that there are different kinds of precedent, even within the common law paradigm. Two related aspects are of particular importance: constitutional precedent and self-precedent. As to the former a distinction is made between constitutional, statutory, and common law precedent. Out of the three, statutory precedent enjoys a "super-strong presumption of correctness," common law precedent occupies a middle position, and constitutional precedent is given a weaker presumption of correctness. 40 The idea behind the weaker protection for constitutional precedent is the difficulty the legislator faces if it wants to intervene to object to case law. There are only very limited, external checks on the judicial interpretation of the constitution. In this situation a strong form of precedent would create an undesirable lock-in effect. Consequently, the SCOTUS needs to be able to correct the path of the law. 41 This has been confirmed by the SCOTUS itself.
42
Self-precedent is distinguished from vertical precedent (prior decisions of a higher court) and horizontal precedent (prior decisions issued by a peer court). Self-precedent is a prior decision issued by the same judge or the same court. 43 The distinction is illuminating because the view of precedent changes as these relationships change. Gascón observes that, while 37 
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G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l Vol. 18 No. 03 important differences exist between the common law and civil law traditions as regards vertical precedent, the same does not hold true for self-precedent. 44 Self-precedent does not require the court to always follow its previous judgments. It only requires the judge to justify departures from his or her previous rulings. 45 The underlying idea of self-precedent is not legal certainty or stability but rationality and the absence of arbitrariness.
46
Komárek has developed the fundamental plurality of precedent into his theory of reasoning with previous decisions, identifying the legislative model as distinct from the traditional case-bound model. 47 In the legislative model judgments are drafted and interpreted as if they were legislative texts and the authority of the court is derived from its position in the judicial hierarchy. Thus, the wording of the judgment is closely scrutinized in search of a rulelike pronouncement by a higher court.
48
The use of the legislative model of reasoning with previous decisions is not limited to the civil law tradition. Both the SCOTUS and the CJEU occupy positions that enable the use of the legislative model. The former court selects the cases to decide, delivers a small number of judgments each year, and is widely regarded as a political institution. 49 The latter court was clearly envisioned as a superior authority on the interpretation of EU law. Neither the SCOTUS nor the CJEU are specialized constitutional courts like the ones found in many legal orders that have centralized judicial review, 50 like for example the German Bundsverfassungsgericht, but both are constitutional courts in the sense that they by merit of their elevated positions in their respect systems perform constitutional functions in a way and to an extent that distinguish them from lower courts of their respective legal systems. 51 44 Gascón, supra note 43, at 37. 45 Id. at 43. 46 Id. at 37-38. 47 Jan Komárek, Reasoning with Previous Decisions: Beyond the Doctrine of Precedent, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 149 (2013). 48 Id. at 162-63.
In conclusion, we have to adjust our expectations when discussing how the CJEU establishes and uses precedent. We cannot expect the Luxembourg court to treat its own case law in the same way as a lower common law court would treat case law from a higher court. The CJEU is a constitutional court and it has a particular assignment in the legal system. It is reasonable that these courts will build upon their own previous cases, but the format is constitutional self-precedent.
C. Methodological Questions

I. Finding a Yardstick -The SCOTUS as an Object of Comparison
This article examines how the CJEU establishes and uses precedent. Our study draws inspiration from a comparison with the SCOTUS. This is a comparative study, with the comparison serving as an instrument to gain a better understanding of the CJEU.
In any comparison both similarities and differences are examined in order to gain the most fruitful results. 52 The differences between the two courts are obvious and include basic structural differences as well as differences in argumentation and style. One noticeable distinction is that the SCOTUS has the power to grant or deny certiori, while the CJEU has no similar docket control mechanism. The CJEU court can expedite the process for questions already answered. 53 But it cannot close areas of case law to further discussion and rely on the existing decisions, as the SCOTUS can. 54 There are also clear differences in style between the argumentative reasoning of the SCOTUS and the official, authoritative voice of the CJEU. Though, as pointed out by Lasser, the latter aspect is mitigated by the voice of the Advocate General. 55 Still, the two courts also have significant similarities, making a comparison viable. It is always problematic to compare the CJEU with any other court, given the peculiarities of the Luxembourg court. While it is unhelpful to fall back on the sui generis description, 56 the CJEU certainly occupies an unusual position, being neither a national court nor a traditional, international court. The Luxembourg court has, on its own initiative and using the basic treaties of the Union, taken on the role of a constitutional court, developing EU law into an 52 
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G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l Vol. 18 No. 03 effective legal system. Thus, it is reasonable to treat the CJEU as a constitutional court, 57 making a comparison with another constitutional court such as the SCOTUS both practical and fruitful. In the words of Tridimas, the SCOTUS is an interesting comparison, as it "exercises constitutional jurisdiction in a pluralist judicial system applying an abstract founding law".
58
Finally, we have chosen the SCOTUS for comparison with the CJEU because of the established position of precedent in the American legal system in general and in the SCOTUS in particular. Stare decisis, the binding force of precedent, has been said to be "the defining feature of American courts," 59 including the SCOTUS. The justices regard the principle as "the heart of the rule of law." 60 Naturally, it could be claimed that the SCOTUS has lost its way and deviated from its common law roots. For example, it is frequently pointed out that the SCOTUS takes a less rigorous attitude towards precedent as compared to English courts. 61 But it is difficult to claim that precedent is not an important part of the American legal system.
II. The Broader Perspective -A Short Introduction to Network Analysis
This study compares the approaches to precedent in the CJEU and the SCOTUS from a network perspective. The main network analysis concepts employed in the article are nodes, links, centrality, and authority. 62 The first step when performing network analysis is to 57 Takis Tridimas, The Court of Justice and Judicial Activism, 21 EUR. L. REV. 199 (1996) . 58 Tridimas, supra note 12, at 324. We also believe that a comparison between the two courts is interesting as both are arguably driven by ideas. While this concept cannot be fully explored here, the essential idea is the following: The CJEU is not linked to any country but rather to an abstract idea of Europe, see e.g., Ditlev Tamm, 
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arrange the judgments into a network, the raw network. The raw network consists of judgments (nodes) and citations between judgments (links). 63 As citations can only go backwards in time the network is directed, making every link both an out-link (a link from a node) and an in-link (a link to a node). 64 The network is constructed solely from actual citations -the links. This enables us to claim that the network and the resulting patterns are natural, in the sense that they correlate with the perception of the judges of the respective court.
The relative importance of a node (i.e. a judgment) is referred to as its centrality in the network. There are several ways of calculating centrality, the most obvious being simply counting the number of links to a node, in this context that would involve determining the number of citations a particular decision generates. The number of links to and from a node is also referred to as the node's degree. Thus, when speaking of a node's in-degree centrality we are referring to the number of citations to a particular judgment.
65
In-degree centrality is a straightforward centrality measurement, but it can be misleading when applied to case law. Counting the number of times a decision has been cited is not necessarily the best way of measuring its importance. All citations are not equal; being cited by a case, which is in itself important, should count for more than a citation from an unimportant case. Similarly, the fact that a decision is rarely cited does not conclusively prove that it is relatively unimportant, as a decision can be the basis of other cases and be at the core of an important area.
At the same time, it would be unacceptable to conclude that only old, foundational cases are important and that more recent cases are irrelevant. A balance between the two extremes must be struck. In this regard, measuring cases' importance by using in-degree centrality will invariably favor older cases over newer cases, simply due to the fact that the former has had more time than the latter to accumulate citations.
A better approach is therefore to use a non-local centrality measurement, 66 also known as a feedback centrality measurement, thus called because rather than assuming that every 63 . 66 Other examples of such measurements, besides the ones discussed below, are Eigenvector and Katz centrality.
See generally
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G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l Vol. 18 No. 03 citation is equally valuable, a decision's centrality is based on the characteristics of cases that refer to it. 67 Using such measurements, an important node is one that is linked to other important nodes. 68 In the context of a case law network, this conforms to the legally intuitive view that an important decision is a decision cited by other important decisions.
In order to facilitate comparisons we follow Fowler in using authority score. 69 Authority is one aspect of the HITS algorithm that was developed by Jon Kleinberg. 70 This algorithm provides two centrality measurements for each node: hub score and authority score.
71
Authority score is a measurement of the amount of knowledge held by a node and, in a case law network, authority score therefore becomes a measurement of a decision's importance in a traditional sense, calculated by citations from the hubs of the network, discussed below. In case law networks, nodes with a high authority score (authorities) are decisions that are important because they say something vital about the content or development of the law. In other words, they are influential cases.
72
Hubs (nodes with high hub score) are nodes that know how to find information on a given topic in the network. In case law networks, hubs are decisions that cite important decisions. In other words, they are well-grounded decisions. 73 71 The initial step of using the HITS algorithm is to construct a focused subgraph of the network, for which the algorithm is employed. See Kleinberg, supra note 65, at 608-10. This is necessary in the context of the World Wide Web and other large networks in order to limit computational cost, but not with a network as small as ours. Consequently, we operate the HITS algorithm on the entire CJEU case law network. 72 Fowler et al., supra note 28, at 331. 73 Id.
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The CJEU & SCOTUS -A Network Perspective 659 nodes are mutually reinforcing: a good authority is a node pointed to by many good hubs, and a good hub is a node that points to many good authorities. 74 This definition is circular, which is why the algorithm must be iterative and take into account the entire network and assume that the sum of the authority-weight and the sum of the hub-weight are equal.
75
D. First Argument -Basic Features of a Network
I. Introduction -A Non-Random Approach
In order to constitute a case law network, we can reasonably expect judgments to be connected through citations and that those citations are made on the basis of the issues discussed in each case. At least, in case X concerning issue A we expect the court to cite its previous decision in case Y concerning the same issue and we expect it not to cite case Z concerning issue B. When we extrapolate this reasoning to a whole network of case law, we expect certain patterns to emerge. 76 First, we expect decisions to be connected to each other by citation to a relatively high degree, here referred to as the connectedness of the network. If the judgments are very loosely connected to each other, then this suggests that the court is not citing relevant cases, potentially because there are no relevant cases. 77 Second, we expect that citations among cases are not distributed equally or, to use network analysis terminology, the network's degree distribution does not follow a flat or normal distribution. Instead, certain precedents where particularly important points of law were established should receive most of the citations and the great majority of judgments should receive relatively few citations. 78 As explained below, the CJEU's case law network is quite similar to the SCOTUS's in both these regards and distinctly different from a random network. Thus, the first argument in support of our claim is that similarities in these basic features of the CJEU and SCOTUS case law networks negate claims that the CJEU establishes and uses precedent randomly. While 74 Kleinberg, supra note 65, at 611. 75 Kleinberg gives the following example, where p denotes page, x authority weight and y hub weight: "If p points to many pages with large x-values, then it should receive a large y-value; and if p is pointed to by many pages with large y-values, then it should receive a large x-value." Kleinberg, supra note 65, at 611 (italics omitted). In other words, if a judgment cites many influential cases, it should be considered a well-founded case, and if a judgment is cited by many well-founded cases it should be considered an influential case. 76 Naturally, this is only a minimum requirement. In reality a court will often interact with judgments that are similar, for example in order to distinguish them. 77 See infra Part D.II. 78 See infra part D.III.
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II. Connectedness
In network analysis, the degree of connectedness between nodes is referred to as the density of the network. A network's density is calculated by comparing the actual number of links to the potential number of links in a complete network, i.e. one where every node (i.e. case) is connected to every other. By dividing the former with the latter one derives a measure between 0 and 1 where 1 is the density of a complete network.
79
While both the CJEU and SCOTUS networks are fairly sparse, they differ significantly from each other. The density of the CJEU's citation network is 0.00096. 80 The density of the SCOTUS network studied by Fowler & Jeon is, by comparison, only 0.00048. 81 Thus, the SCOTUS network's density is only half that of the CJEU's. This may at first appear surprising considering that, on average, a recent SCOTUS judgment contains roughly twice as many citations as a CJEU judgment. 82 The explanation is very simple: network size. 84 In fact, the CJEU network is growing about five times as fast as the USSC network and will surpass it in size around the year 2085 if the current trend continues.
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historically increased in both networks, 86 there is a very real, practical limit to how many citations can be included in a single judgment.
Considering this, it is necessary to use an alternative measurement for network connectedness. One such alternative is inclusiveness, which "is the total number of points minus the number of isolated points." 87 In this context, an "isolated point" is a case that neither cites nor is cited by at least one other case. Networks can be usefully compared by measuring "the number of connected points expressed as a proportion of the total number of points." 88 When we use inclusiveness instead of density a very different picture emerges. In the CJEU case law network 89% of all CJEU decisions are connected by citation, inward or outward, to at least one other case. That is, 11% of all cases are unconnected, i.e. do not cite any other case and are not cited by any other case. This finding alone suggests that the CJEU has a method when it cites case law, for if citations were actually distributed randomly the network's inclusiveness would be much higher, nearly complete.
The inclusiveness among CJEU decisions is quite similar to that of SCOTUS judgments: the SCOTUS network has an only slightly lower inclusiveness of 84%.
89 Thus, we see that the CJEU not only has a method but that the CJEU's method and the SCOTUS's method produce networks with very similar degrees of inclusiveness. This does not necessarily mean that they are the same or even similar methods, but it indicates that the CJEU approaches previous judgments in a consistent matter. 86 See infra Part E.III. 87 SCOTT, supra note 79, at 81. 88 Id. 
III. Degree Distribution
Another way of proving that the CJEU approaches previous judgments in a consistent way is to consider the degree distribution of the CJEU case law network. Degree distribution is the variation in total number of inward and outward citations, or more generally, the number of links per node. 90 In a random network, where links are placed randomly between nodes, most nodes will have the same number of links.
91 But, as pointed out by Albert & Barabasi, most complex networks are not random and links are not distributed randomly. Instead, complex networks in general and citation networks in particular tend to follow a power law distribution where most nodes will have few links and a small group of nodes will have a great number of links.
92
Translated to the case law networks studied here, most judgments can be expected to have few inward and outward citations, and citations will instead gather in a small group of judgments with a great number of inward and outward citations. Fowler et al. demonstrate that the network of SCOTUS judgments follows a power law distribution, both regarding inward and outward citations (see figure 3 infra) . 93 Similarly, we find that the CJEU case law network is a power-law network. Figure 3 
IV. Interim Conclusions
The CJEU's case law is connected largely in the same way as the constitutional, precedentdriven American court: relatively sparse (i.e. few links as compared to other types of networks) but few cases are entirely disconnected. Furthermore, in both networks, citations clearly follow a power law distribution.
This constitutes a first argument in favor of a conscious approach vis-à-vis case law at the CJEU. The CJEU network is not random, but it also displays patterns that indicate some form of method.
These similarities between the two courts are only a first step. Next we turn our attention to empirical measurement of the development of the networks over time.
E. Second Argument -Case Law as an Indispensable Source of Law
I. Introduction -Humble Beginnings
No legal system can start out with a strong, established system of precedent and this includes the systems studied here. The explanation is partly practical: a minimum core of judgments is needed before a court can develop a systematic citation practice. There are also cultural explanations why neither court started out with a strong, established system of precedent. For the CJEU the cultural explanation can be found in its civil law heritage. The Luxembourg court was created by six continental civil law nations, 94 and modeled mainly on the French system. 95 In such a context, with heavy emphasis on legislation and a relatively limited role for the judiciary, there are clear cultural limits on the Court's capacity to act as a lawmaker. The absence of a system of precedent is hardly surprising. The SCOTUS, by comparison, also lacked a strong system of precedent early on; it hesitated to refer to and build upon its previous decisions prior to the nineteenth century. 96 In this regard it essentially followed the pattern of English courts, where the strengthening of precedent, culminating in the 1898 London Tramways case, 97 started during the nineteenth century.
98
Thus, time is a relevant factor when considering how the SCOTUS and the CJEU established and use precedent. In this section, we present existing research on how the SCOTUS's use of 94 Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. 95 Tamm, supra note 58, at 9. 
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The CJEU & SCOTUS -A Network Perspective 665 precedent developed over time and replicate these studies for the CJEU. In so doing we find that there are fundamental similarities between the SCOTUS and the CJEU in their gradual development towards a position where case law is now an indispensable source of law. The similarities in the development and current state of their approach constitute clear evidence of the CJEU having a system of precedent where new judgments are well embedded in existing case law.
II. The SCOTUS -Development Towards Binding Precedent
There are primarily two network analysis studies of how the SCOTUS's use of precedent has developed over time. The first study, conducted by Fowler & Jeon, investigated how the SCOTUS's citation practice has changed over time using primarily two measurements. The first measurement is average number of citations, i.e. average out-degree. The second measurement, which is a slight modification of the first, is the percentage of SCOTUS decisions each year that contain at least one outward citation. 99 Both measurements illustrate a clear development, with average out-degree and percentage of cases citing at least one previous case increasing during the nineteenth century and continuing to expand during the twentieth century.
The second study, carried out by Johnson et al., came to the same conclusion after finding a steady increase in average out-degree. Out-degree increased from an average of 1.1 citations during the Court's first fifty years to 18.7 citations in the last fifty years. The authors regard this increase as observable evidence of the institutionalization of the norm of precedent at the SCOTUS.
100
Fowler & Jeon furthermore sought to empirically verify the claim made in legal literature that the principle of stare decisis was firmly established in the SCOTUS by the year 1900. There is significant agreement on the correlation between increasing references to precedent and the establishment of the principle of stare decisis, 101 but different perspectives prevail as to when stare decisis was established in the SCOTUS. Fowler & Jeon primarily confirm the 1900 claim on the ground that the increase in the percentage of cases citing at least one previous case levels-off after 1900 at about 90%. 102 Fowler & Jeon do not conclude that 90% of cases citing older decisions is a clear threshold for a system of precedent, only that it was true that 90% of SCOTUS cases cited older cases at the time when 666 G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l Vol. 18 No. 03 traditional legal doctrine claims that stare decisis had been firmly established. Thus, 90% should not be regarded as a requirement for stare decisis, only an indication, and a lower percentage does not rule out the existence of a system of precedent.
Johnson et al. arrive at a seemingly quite different conclusion, claiming that the SCOTUS began to base its decisions on its own precedents by the early 1800s and that the norm of stare decisis was firmly entrenched by 1815. 103 The quite significant difference between the two studies is explained by a difference of perspective. Fowler & Jeon take an absolute perspective, concentrating on outward citations to previous SCOTUS judgments. Johnson et al. take a relative perspective, concentrating on the SCOTUS's transition from using English common law to its own precedent. This development is very clear, with references to English common law decreasing from 75.8% of all citations in 1791-1800 to only 10.9% during 1806-1815. 104 Fowler & Jeon observe a variation in the outward citation pattern by the SCOTUS. The trend is clearly increasing, sharply during the nineteenth century and more modestly during the twentieth century. A clear dip in this trend can be observed-regarding average out-degree (average number of citations in a case to a previous case) and the percentage of cases citing at least one previous judgment-during the so-called Warren Court (1953) (1954) (1955) (1956) (1957) (1958) (1959) (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) ).
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III. The CJEU -From Zero to a Hundred in Thirty-Five Years
The CJEU's use of previous decisions has developed over time. First and most obviously, the total body of CJEU case law has increased steadily over the years. This is of course unavoidable as new decisions are constantly added. But the CJEU's body of case law is growing much faster as it steadily increases the number of cases it settles each year. 110 It is not only the number of CJEU judgments that has increased over time; the same is true for its citation practice. The CJEU has steadily increased the average number of citations it makes to its own case law: from less than 0. citing its own cases appear to be supported by our data. 111 This cannot be (entirely) attributed to the CJEU being bound by its French heritage or inexperience with case law. After all, it took the SCOTUS almost a century to properly start citing its own case law. The comparison suggests that case law-based systems must reach a "critical mass" before courts will start to cite their own case law.
Average out-degree is a straightforward and intuitive measurement for how the CJEU's use of precedent has developed, but it is rather blunt. For example, a high average out-degree might be explained by more cases being available to cite 112 and a few judgments with many citations can have a disproportionately large effect on the yearly average. The latter is particularly true for the early years, when the CJEU decided a very limited number of judgments per year.
113
Given the limitations of average out-degree we follow Fowler & Jeon in considering what percentage of all judgments decided each year involve citations to at least one previous decision. This is, in our opinion, a good measurement of the importance of case law as a source of law: if the CJEU decides few cases without citing precedent, then that suggests that it is in practice an indispensable source of law. Using this measurement, we find a trend similar to that seen by using average out-degree, as the relative portion of judgments citing at least one precedent has increased from (i) around 10% in the early 1970s, to (ii) around 60% in the 1980s, to (iii) around 90% in the last two decades. 114 The trend of three distinct periods of development at the CJEU follows the pattern identified by Fowler & Jeon in the SCOTUS's case law: lack, growth, and finally establishment of case-law use. 
IV. Interim Conclusions
The discussion in the sections above leads us to a number of conclusions. First, it is significant that the CJEU follows the same development as the SCOTUS, with a steady increase in the use of previous decisions. Along with Fowler & Jeon and Johnson et al., 116 we argue that a steady increase in average out-degree and the number of cases citing at least one precedent is a good indicator of case law's increasingly important role as a source of law in the EU framework. Fowler & Jeon come to the conclusion that a high tendency to cite case law suggests the establishment of a norm of stare decisis. 117 We are a little more cautious. Rather than being formally required as a norm of stare decisis, a high frequency could be explained by the court's interest in the legitimacy of its rulings and belief that embedding a decision in previous case law gives it the desired legitimacy. This is supported by our second conclusion, which concerns judicial activism. An interesting difference between the SCOTUS and the CJEU is that the CJEU's trend towards increased reliance on existing case law has largely been continuous and without any significant deviation. If judicial activism leads to a more relaxed attitude vis-à-vis precedent, as suggested by Fowler & Jeon, then the CJEU should demonstrate similar deviations during some "revolutionary" periods identified by other scholars. 118 The consistent development towards ever more extensive use of case law indicates that judicial activism at the CJEU does not exclude reliance on precedent. This is vividly demonstrated by the Francovich decision in which the CJEU established the principle of state liability. 119 Although the case is arguably one of the Luxembourg court's most far-reaching and innovative judgments -or, in Hartley's words, a "confusion of 'ought' and 'is' that no ordinary lawyer would make" 120 -it is one of the CJEU network's foremost hubs. This indicates that it contains references to many important CJEU judgments. 121 Thus, despite being entirely novel, Francovich is firmly connected to previous judgments.
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This follows the basic idea that the use and rhetoric of precedent is a response from the courts to their natural and unavoidable discretion. Unfettered discretion would ultimately threaten the position of the courts, which is why they have voluntarily limited their discretion by following past cases. 122 Following this logic, the greater the novelty of the holdings, then the greater the need to entrench the decision in previous case law in order to achieve legitimacy. This arguably explains the use of previous case law in Francovich. The Court attempts to demonstrate that the legal principle established in the case, while novel, is fundamentally related to other principles and thereby to previous judgments.
Third, development at the CJEU is taking place with remarkable speed compared to the SCOTUS. While the latter court took more than a century to reach a point where case law was firmly established as a source of law, the CJEU achieved the same in about thirty-five years. We argue that by 1989 the CJEU had reached a clear habit of connecting decisions to previous judgments. By 1989 the average out-degree had reached 2.25, exceeding 2 for the first time and only increasing thereafter. Even more importantly, the yearly percentage of cases citing at least one previous case reached 80% by 1989 and never dipped below that threshold again for the time included in the study, but rather increasing to close to 100% in recent years.
Finally, the reasons for the development should be discussed. As noted above the CJEU began referring to its previous decisions in the late 1970s and early 1980s, starting from a very low level. Why did we see this development? Some have speculated that the CJEU's increased tendency to cite its previous judgments can at least partly be explained by the accession of Ireland and Great Britain in 1973. The idea is that this represented an influx from the common law tradition. 123 Although the "common law thesis" may appear plausible, it is not obvious from our data. On the one hand, almost a decade passed between these countries' accession and the increased trend in citations, and once started, that trend has remained largely unbroken for thirty years, during which fifteen "civil law countries" were admitted as Member States. On the other hand, if viewed from a longer perspective, it cannot be ruled out that the 1973 accession started a process that eventually lead to a new view of precedent in the CJEU, in particular given the very low levels of citation before 1973.
However, while the accession of the common law countries might be a factor, the development must be viewed from a broader perspective, where the move to precedent is part of an effort to legitimize the law-making efforts of the CJEU. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that the SCOTUS, which has undisputedly been part of the common law tradition since its very inception, follows largely the same development as the CJEU.
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F. Third Argument -The Anatomy of a Method
I. Introduction
We have argued that the CJEU has a conscious approach to case law (Part D) and that it treats case law as an indispensable source of law (Part E). In this final part, we will discuss the substance of that approach.
We do not claim that the CJEU's approach to its own case law is beyond reproach, but as elaborated below we believe that it can to a large extent be described as the combined result of four components: (i) stages of development, (ii) issue shifting, (iii) a general approach to existing case law, including a specific approach to important cases, and (iv) overruling and avoiding precedent. This not only shows that the CJEU's approach has substance. A comparison with the SCOTUS's approach and how it has developed over time suggests that the CJEU's approach represents a credible exercise of judicial authority in a case law system.
II. Stages of Development
One way of capturing how the CJEU establishes and uses precedent is to consider how its approach to case law has developed over time. This issue lies at the heart of the Court's supposedly poor and inexperienced approach to case law. 125 A first way of measuring this is to consider how citations to case law, i.e. in-degree centrality, are distributed over time by looking at average yearly inward citations. This provides us with a rough map of when CJEU precedents were established (see figure 9 infra) and permits several observations.
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G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l Vol. 18 No. 03 First, we see that inward citations are not distributed evenly over time, but that, generally speaking, they are increasing over time and then decreasing for the most recent years. In both these regards, the CJEU's citation practice mirrors that of the SCOTUS and makes theoretical sense. The fact that the average number of inward citations increases over time is natural given that (i) the number of decisions made increases every year, 126 (ii) the average 126 See supra number of outward citations increases every year, 127 and (iii) when it comes to citing nonleading cases, the CJEU has a tendency to cite fairly recent cases.
128 Thus, the observed tendency is the product, and confirmation, of various aspects of the CJEU's approach. That recent decisions have been cited fewer times is unavoidable because they simply have not had the same chances to be cited. 129 Second, although the overall development is an increase in inward citations over time, this development is not as steady and constant as the development in outward citations and while early variations can be attributed to a small sample size, the same is not true for later years. In fact, the CJEU data clearly illustrates that the mid-to late-1970s was a golden era of case law.
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The same can also be said about the SCOTUS and is consistent with the thesis of the CJEU as a constitutional, precedent-driven court. For a court that takes developing case law seriously there should be an overall increase in average inward citations that illustrates the continuous development of law, but unless the court has a mechanical approach there will also be outliers. Since citations tend to concentrate in a few, central decisions, 131 average inward citations will increase considerably in years when those central decisions are decided. For example, the high average number of inward citations in 1974 is largely attributable to the CJEU's decision in Dassonville, 132 the second most cited decision ever.
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Third, related to the discussion above, deviations from the observed trends during more extended periods can indicate a historically anomalous period of case law development.
134
Fowler & Jeon identify a sharp drop in mean inward citations during the judicially-active Warren Court (1953) (1954) (1955) (1956) (1957) (1958) (1959) (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) 135 that mirrors the below-average outward citations during the 127 See supra Figure 6 . 128 See infra Part F.IV. 129 The length of the "tail" suggests that it on average takes seven years for a case to reach its peak citation potential. However, we return to this issue in Part F.IV infra. 130 See figure 9 supra. 131 See supra Part D.III and figure 2. G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l Vol. 18 No. 03 same period. 136 Fowler & Jeon present two possible explanations for this trend: either that the Warren Court's judgments had a weak legal basis and were therefore of less interest to subsequent compositions of the court, or that the court subsequently shifted to a more conservative policy. 137 The absence of any similar periods regarding CJEU case law indicates a more stable, homogenous court, continuing to build on the achievements of previous compositions.
III. Issue Shifting
We expect that a constitutional, precedent-driven court will not continuously deliver decisions on the same legal issue but to shift focus over time, first developing law in one area and when it is "done" moving on to another. Mature constitutional courts tend to engage in this type of strategic issue shifting. For example, in their study of the SCOTUS, Fowler & Jeon demonstrated that the Court shifted focus from commercial issues to civil rights in the 1960s by tracing the authority score of key cases over time (see Figure 11 infra). Because of how an authority score is calculated, 138 a rise in authority score over time occurs because new, well-grounded cases (hubs) citing that case are added to the network. Similarly, a decline in authority score means that the new cases added to the area do not cite the case. This, in turn, could indicate that the court has turned its attention to other issues.
139 136 See supra Part E.II. 137 Fowler & Jeon, supra note 28, at 19-20. 138 See supra Part C.II. 139 If we are studying a single case an alternative explanation is that the case has been overruled and is no longer good law. See further infra Part F.V. A third, possible explanation is that the Court instead cites another case in support of the same point of law.
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Figure 11. SCOTUS, Issue Shifting
To study issue shifting in the CJEU we use the same approach as Fowler & Jeon but with some modifications. First, rather than studying individual cases, we have tracked the mean authority score of key decisions in the areas of free movement of goods, 140 competition law, 141 and constitutional law. 142 To ensure a fair comparison, the decisions studied are all from the 1960s and 1970s represent still-binding law, and the tracking begins more than eight years after the most recent decisions were decided. 143 Second, it is difficult to compare how much attention the CJEU pays to a particular group of cases using their total absolute authority score since the numbers differ greatly. Instead, we track the group's authority score relative to its own peak score over time. 144 Third, instead of using a yearly average, we calculate each group's authority score after each new citation is added to the network (see Figure 12 infra). This reveals that the amount of attention the CJEU has paid to free movement of goods, competition law, and constitutional law has shifted a lot over time. Early, and for a long time, the CJEU paid much attention to the free movement of goods. During this era, key cases in that area were the best authorities in the network. Over time the court shifted focus to other issues, such as constitutional law and competition law. This is evident in the gradual increase in authority scores of key cases in these areas, many of which had been around for a longer time than the key decisions regarding free movement of goods. Towards the end of the period studied the decisions on free movement of goods had lost more than 75% of their peak authority scores.
This illustrates how the CJEU's relative attention to various areas has shifted over time. The observed trends are also consistent with the Court spreading its attention between more areas of law as the breadth of EU law gradually expanded beyond its historical focus on the free movement of goods. This would explain, for example, why the development of decisions in constitutional law and competition law for a long time closely mirrored each other and why they more recently declined. The Court is again shifting its attention to new areas. In this regard one of the more interesting phenomena is the more recent increase in authority score for competition law cases. If our explanation for the overall trends is correct, then this suggests that the CJEU has returned to the issue of competition law despite other, newer areas demanding its attention.
Given the fact that the CJEU has only been active for about sixty years-compared to the SCOTUS's more than two hundred and fifty years-the relative lack of evidence of more significant shifts in issue priorities is understandable. Furthermore, given the relatively limited amount of data not all priority shifts can be easily detected empirically.
IV. The Half-Life of Important and Non-Important Cases
It was discussed above that citations follow an unequal distribution, where a small group of important cases receive the large majority of all citations and most cases are very rarely cited. 145 Along similar lines, we expect the CJEU to treat important and non-important cases differently in other respects as well. We would expect the average judgment's usefulness as a precedent to initially and gradually increase, as it is cited for the information it holds on a particular issue, up to a peak, and then decline as newer cases on the same issue are decided or the issue becomes settled. 146 In comparison, it is axiomatically true that important cases will age better than unimportant cases.
Fowler & Jeon's study shows that the SCOTUS behaves in this manner. They observe that the average time to peak authority score is somewhat shorter for important SCOTUS judgments than for unimportant judgments.
147 Also, unimportant cases' authority scores decline more quickly than important cases'.
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When examining how the CJEU's judgments' authority scores develop over time (see Figure  13 infra), we find interesting similarities and differences when compared to the SCOTUS. The CJEU's judgments' authority scores generally follow the same development as the SCOTUS's, building gradually to a peak and then steadily declining in importance. We will refer to this as the "Banana index," in the sense that judgments go through three phases: green (still developing), yellow (peak), and brown (declining).
The most obvious difference between the two courts in this regard is that it takes a CJEU decision significantly less time to reach peak authority. CJEU judgments reach peak authority score after an average of eight years, compared to circa twenty-seven years for SCOTUS 145 See supra Part D.III. 146 Fowler & Jeon, supra note 28, at 25. 147 Id. (25.5 years compared to 27.2 years). 148 Id. (as expected, important cases reaches a higher average authority at peak as compared to other cases).
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judgments. 149 Interestingly, there is no similar difference in decline rate. An average SCOTUS case will have lost 25% of its authority about five years after peak and 50% after about seventeen years; 150 the comparable time for an average CJEU case is eight years and thirteen years. Thus, the CJEU is quick to cite new cases and they become settled after a short time. The judgments also stay relevant for a surprisingly long time, as compared to time to peak and in comparison with the SCOTUS. Figure 14 infra). First, important CJEU decisions seem to take less time to peak than the average decision, within four to six years. The almost instant impact of cases like Keck and PreussenElektra is obvious from the almost vertical rise in authority. Some cases have a more staggered development. The Marleasing decision, for example, eventually reached a high authority score than Francovich or Keck, but it took twice as long to get there. This suggests that the CJEU only gradually warmed to the use of Marleasing in later cases. Factortame is even more controversial, initially rising fast but then the development breaks and the case continues a troubled up-and-down existence at a lower level of authority. 
V. Overruling and Avoiding Precedent
In any legal system where judgments constitute an important source of law, overruling and otherwise avoiding previous cases becomes relevant, the most obvious form being formal overruling, traditionally the prerogative of a court higher up in the judicial hierarchy. 153 With an express overruling the authority of the previous decision is wiped clean, replaced by the new judgment. 154 But there are less dramatic ways of avoiding a troublesome judgment. Overruling can be implied when the later court regards the previous judgments as wrongly decided. Furthermore, a previous ruling can be undermined if a later court concludes that a 682 G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l Vol. 18 No. 03 previous court misunderstood the law. 155 The rise and fall of judgments as they are overturned or otherwise avoided can be traced in the networks of the courts' precedent.
The academic opinion on overturning precedent in the SCOTUS is split. It is sometimes claimed that the tendency to overturn previous decisions is the main difference between the English and American doctrine of precedent. 156 On the other hand, Gerhardt claims that overruling constitutional precedents "constitutes a tiny fraction of what the [SCOTUS] does." 157 Fowler & Jeon concur, classifying overruling at the SCOTUS as "extremely rare," with only 252 overturned judgments. 158 The network analysis demonstrates that overruled cases have higher than average authority, indicating that the SCOTUS is more likely to overturn judgments that could influence later decisions.
159 Naturally, once a judgment has been overruled its importance will gradually decrease, while the importance of the overruling judgment will increase. Thus, the development of the judgments will intersect, with the overruling judgment surpassing the overruled decision after about ten years. The overruling judgment will then continue to increase in importance for almost thirty additional years. 160 Similarly, it is reasonable to assume that the overruling cases are grounded in previous case law to a degree above average. This is confirmed for the SCOTUS network, with overruling cases having about five times higher hub scores than other cases. More specifically, the hub score of an overruling case appears to be closely connected to the authority score of the overruled case. In other words, the more important the overruled case is, the more wellgrounded the overruling case will be. 161 This makes intuitive sense. When overruling a wellestablished old case the court has an interest in "anchoring" the new judgment in other cases, thus demonstrating that the overruling is not arbitrary or political.
The CJEU is frequently accused of not being explicit about overturning precedent. 162 Examples of the CJEU changing its case law radically without acknowledging the fact can be 155 Id. at 129-30. 156 Cross & Harris claim that " [t] here are many instances, some American lawyers would say too many, in which the Supreme Court has overruled a previous decision." Id. at 19. No source is given as to who these "American lawyers" are. 157 GERHARDT, supra note 54, at 34. 158 Fowler & Jeon, supra note 28, at 25. 159 Id. 160 Id. at 25-26. 161 Id. at 26. 162 See, e.g., Tridimas, supra note 12, at 316.
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found, including the famous Stauder case in which the CJEU made a complete turnabout concerning the protection of fundamental rights in EU law. 163 But it is hardly surprising that the CJEU was not explicit about its overruling in Stauder, given that the open use of previous decisions had not been established at that point in time.
Furthermore, we have no classification of CJEU overruling with which to compute average authority scores for overruling cases as compared to other cases. If we want to understand overruling in the CJEU we should choose examples from the 1990-2011 period, when the Luxembourg court routinely made use of previous decisions. 164 Conveniently, the most famous 165 example of explicit overruling at the CJEU occurred at this time with the Court's Keck decision. 166 The CJEU was unusually clear in Keck about the change made to case law, concluding that it was "necessary to re-examine and clarify its case law." 167 The problem is that the CJEU does not specify which old cases are overturned and which remain good law. 168 Still, following the method of Fowler & Jeon, we can study the rise and fall of decisions' authority score following Keck. Torfaen is an obvious example of bad law following Keck, as the CJEU treated selling arrangements as prima facie violations of what is now Article 34 TFEU. 169 Comparing how the two decisions' authority scores have developed demonstrates that Torfaen is no longer good law following Keck (see Figure 15 infra). Torfaen was initially regarded as an important authority in the area, but its prominence immediately fell with the arrival of Keck, whose authority score increased explosively, remaining a top authority until the start of its decline more than a decade later.
